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PINKERTON SHORT-CIRCUITS THE MODEL PENAL CODE
ANDREW INGRAM*
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS is an article about unintended consequences.  It is about whatcriminals do not foresee when they join a conspiracy, and it is about
what legislators do not anticipate when they make piecemeal amendments
to the text of the Model Penal Code.
Consider what Veronica failed to see coming.  Her boyfriend Sam is
visiting from out of town, and she helps him to arrange a meeting with an
acquaintance of hers named Jake to buy some cocaine.  At the meeting,
Jake takes Sam’s money but does not give him the drugs.  Sam is angry at
everyone, including Veronica.  He and his friend Pierce want Veronica to
drive them around town to find Jake and get his money and the cocaine.
Veronica wants to propitiate Sam and make up for her role in the loss of
his money.  If the men find Jake, she expects a heated confrontation (she
sees that Sam and Pierce have guns), but, perhaps due to her naive opti-
mism, she believes the men will only threaten to use their pistols.  She
drives Sam and Pierce by several homes where Jake might be and sees
them force their way through the front door of one residence and emerge
without finding Jake.
Veronica thinks of one more place Jake might be.  She leads Sam and
Pierce to this last house.  Sam and Pierce push their way inside when the
door opens and shut it behind them.  While waiting in the car, Veronica
hears gunshots.  Jake was not there, but the occupants (Lucky and Mar-
shall) did not appreciate being forced against the wall and interrogated in
their own house.  There was a struggle and during the fight, Sam shot and
killed Lucky.
Veronica is not innocent here.  She knew that she was helping Sam
and Pierce break down people’s doors looking for Jake.  That itself is
blameworthy.  She also should have been aware of the risk that someone
could have been killed when Sam and Pierce brought along guns.  It
seems plausible too that she did in fact see the risk to life posed by her
conduct but chose to drive the men around anyway.  In either case, she
would be blameworthy for her part in creating those risks.  On the facts as
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I have described them, however, she did not plausibly intend to kill some-
one, nor did she know that someone would be killed.
In many jurisdictions, a prosecutor could nonetheless charge Vero-
nica with much more than burglary (as an accomplice).  She could charge
Veronica with conspiracy to commit burglary (breaking into the houses)
or aggravated robbery (conspiring to hold Jake at gunpoint to get the
drugs or money from him).  Seeing that the facts technically make out a
conspiracy would earn a high grade, but an astute law student could get an
A+ for noticing that the prosecutor could also charge Veronica with mur-
der.  On a Pinkerton1 theory, Veronica is vicariously liable for the murder
of Lucky because it was foreseeable that Sam or Pierce would kill someone
in one of the houses they busted into.
Veronica did not believe that anyone would be killed—at most she
was conscious of the risk that someone would be killed.  A lay person or
law student who missed the day on Pinkerton would be caught napping if
he said that, surely, Veronica cannot be charged with the same crime as
Sam.  I think though that many legislators would also be surprised to know
that Veronica can be charged, convicted, and punished the same as Sam.
If any of the above are not surprised at what can happen to Veronica
in the criminal justice system, then I would venture that it is because they
already expect too little justice from the system.  In this article, I will align
myself with the criminal law scholars who insist that culpability or moral
blameworthiness is a sine qua non of criminal liability and that criminal
punishment should not be disproportionate to a person’s culpability.2  An-
yone who expects the criminal law to take serious account of culpability
should be surprised that Veronica can be charged with murder.
The belief that criminal liability should not exceed culpability was a
basic premise of the drafters of the Model Penal Code.3  This commitment
was baked into the text through the Code’s provisions on mens rea: the
section of the Code dealing with mens rea is titled “General Requirements
of Culpability.”4  It makes committing a crime “purposely” the most culpa-
ble mens rea and committing a crime “negligently” the least.5  Consistent
with this view of culpability, the drafters of the Code rejected the Pinkerton
theory of vicarious liability for all crimes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy that were reasonably foreseeable to the conspirator.6
1. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
2. E.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABIL-
ITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 6–7 (2009); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW  415 (1978).
3. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments 1985) (explaining that the Code seeks “to safeguard conduct that
is without fault from condemnation as criminal”).
4. Id. § 2.02.
5. See ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN, supra note 2, at 24 (“This hierarchy pre-
supposes that purpose is more culpable than knowledge, knowledge is more culpa-
ble than recklessness, and recklessness is more culpable than negligence.”).
6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a).
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Since its creation, the Code has proven influential, and many states
adopted its text in whole or in part.7  In some states, like Texas and New
Jersey, Pinkerton was restored through amending their versions of the
Code.8  In other states, Pinkerton lives as a child of the judiciary.9
Pinkerton and the Model Penal Code, however, are poorly matched.
The Code is built on certain guiding principles, among them the culpabil-
ity principle, and its interlocking provisions are so drawn that the princi-
ples can be realized in a consistent fashion.  For example, murder, which
may be committed knowingly or intentionally, is a felony of the first de-
gree.10  Manslaughter applies to killings that are committed recklessly
(when the killer was conscious of the risk of death she imposed on the
victim) and is a felony of the second degree.11  Lastly, “negligent homi-
cide” is taking someone’s life negligently—when one should have been
aware of the risk of death one’s conduct created but was not in fact
aware.12  It is a third-degree felony.13
Pinkerton short-circuits all this and gives the prosecution a path to a
conviction for a first-degree felony with mens rea proof that could other-
wise only produce a third-degree conviction.  Not only is this facially in-
consistent with and contrary to the logic of the Code, but it causes the
Code’s culpability tracking function to go haywire.  If we are convinced
that punishments should not exceed culpability, then we should wish to
see the state codes set right on this point.
The article is structured as follows.  I first outline the arguments for
why culpability should be a necessary condition of criminal liability and
review how the Model Penal Code implements this condition.  I also de-
scribe the origins of the Pinkerton doctrine, its rejection by the drafters of
the Code, and the form it now takes in many states.  In the next section, I
explain in detail how tossing Pinkerton into the criminal law of a state with
a penal code based on the MPC upsets the apple cart.  I include an ex-
treme example from Texas where Pinkerton has been used to convict a
coconspirator of capital murder and sentence her to a term of life in
prison without possibility of parole!  Before concluding, I propose a re-
form that would retain liability of conspirators for the foreseeable crimes
of their coconspirators but only permit them to be convicted of offenses
7. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A
Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007).
8. Compare id. (listing New Jersey and Texas as states that undertook revisions
of their criminal codes under the model code’s influence), with State v. Bridges,
628 A.2d 270, 275–76 (N.J. 1993) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (West 2010)) and
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (West 2003).
9. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Pinkerton Problem, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 607,
615 n.35 (2011) (collecting cases).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2.
11. Id. §§ 2.02(2)(c), 210.3.
12. Id. §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.4.
13. Id. § 210.4.
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that can be committed with the type of mens rea they actually possessed
toward those foreseeable crimes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Crime and Culpability
The idea that criminal punishments must be related to the desert of
the defendant is called “retributivism.”  In its strongest form, retributivism
proclaims that a criminal punishment must be imposed if and only if a
defendant deserves that degree of punishment.14  This strong form of re-
tributivism, however, does not enjoy the support of all retributivists.  Some
deny that the state must undertake to punish every culpable person, but
still insist that the defendant’s culpability is a necessary condition of pun-
ishment.15  What all retributivists agree upon is that criminal liability is
subject to a culpability “side-constraint” that limits who can be punished
and sets the ceiling for the amount of punishment the state can inflict at
the level of the defendant’s just deserts.16 Pinkerton liability, we shall see,
permits prosecutions that exceed this ceiling.
The Model Penal Code refers to its section on mens rea as a culpabil-
ity provision with good reason.  This is because retributivism reflects the
belief that the criminal sanction is properly directed against people who
make choices to break laws that prohibit harming or imperiling others.17
Rather than trying to reduce antisocial behavior by treating people who
engage in it as wild animals that need to be driven off or discouraged by
fear and pain, the criminal law should appeal to people’s ability to regu-
late their own behavior and follow rules.18  The theory thereby comforts
the innocent person who can (hopefully) count on not being punished so
long as she follows the criminal law’s rules.
Separating the innocent from the guilty is a matter of pinning down
what choices each individual made.  Even when we are sure that a person
made some guilty choice, it does not follow that he is guilty of the particular
charge laid against him.  But deciding what choices an individual made is
a function of figuring out what he thought he was doing, i.e., his mental
state.
Between the person who causes harm in total innocence (a person
who unwittingly returns home from abroad with a contagious disease) and
the willful criminal, there are those who commit crimes with intermediate
14.  ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN, supra note 2, at 7.
15. See id. at 7–8 (describing “weak” and “moderate” forms of retributivism).
16. See J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3,
4 (1982) (discussing the divisions and consensus within retributivism).
17. See ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN, supra note 2, at 6 (“[I]t considers an
actor deserving of punishment when he violates these norms that forbid the unjusti-
fied harming of, or risking harm to, others—that is, failing to give others’ interests
their proper weight.”).
18. See id. at 4–6.
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degrees of awareness and intent.  Sometimes, a person makes choices
knowing that her conduct will hurt someone but without that goal in
mind.  At other times, she may not be certain that what she does will hurt
others, but she is aware that it will place them in great danger.  In these
intermediate cases, there is a difference in the choices being made, and
these choices are not equally culpable.  This is why murder is one crime
and manslaughter is another.  Fidelity to the culpability principle requires
that one who made a less culpable choice (to get to work quick by speed-
ing through his pedestrian neighborhood) is not convicted and punished
for making a different, perhaps more culpable choice (to aim his car at his
pedestrian neighbor and stomp the gas pedal).
Not all scholars accept retributivism,19 but there is something very
close to a consensus around the idea that culpability is a side-constraint on
the criminal law.20  In the next section, I will show how the Model Penal
Code rationalized mens rea in order to make it an effective instrument for
differentiating culpable choices.  Even if one rejects a culpability condi-
tion on the criminal justice system, it remains true that the Model Penal
Code is an attempt at a rational system for assessing culpability.  The
health of the law’s internal logic—a necessity for the consistent treatment
of offenders—is enough reason to watch how culpability is handled in
states that adopted a version of the Model Code.
B. Mens Rea in the Model Code
In their own words, the drafters of the Model Penal Code sought “to
safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal”
and “to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses.”21  Accordingly, they insisted that mere behavior not be criminal-
ized, but only voluntary acts undertaken with a culpable mental state.  The
Code declares, “A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is
based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act of which he is physically capable.”22  It adds that “a person is not
guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element
of the offense.”23  Thus the Code hews to a mens rea requirement, with
the exception of a small number of strict liability offenses, which it at-
tempts to limit to regulatory “violations” carrying fines only.24
19. E.g., Miko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24
MELB. U. L. REV. 124, 124 (2000).
20. See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISON-
MENT 83, 84 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punish-
ment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 305–06 (2005).
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2017).
22. Id. § 2.01(1).
23. Id. § 2.02(1).
24. See id. § 2.05 & note.
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The Code’s mens rea provision has proved to be one of its most influ-
ential contributions to the law.25  Praised for clarifying a recondite and
misleading array of legal diction and doctrine,26 the Code took the pano-
ply of mens rea terms used in statutes and common law decisions—words
like “specific intent,” “general intent,” “malice,” and “willful,”—and re-
placed them with just four expressly defined mental states.27  Moreover, it
graded them and put them in order of their seriousness: “each represents
a different level of culpability.”28
Because they were working on a model code rather than a bunch of
model statutes, the drafters wrote the hierarchal mens rea provisions to
correspond to a hierarchy of criminal conduct and punishments.  For ex-
ample, a person is guilty of arson if he starts a fire with the purpose of
destroying someone else’s building; he is guilty of “reckless burning” if he
purposely starts a fire and thereby recklessly puts someone else’s building
in danger of destruction.29  Arson is a felony of the second degree, and
reckless burning is a felony of the third degree.30  A felony of the second
degree is punishable by one year to ten years imprisonment, a felony of
the third degree by one year to five years imprisonment.31
These provisions redefining the traditional fire crimes illustrate the
Model Code’s method of tuning punishment to culpability.  The variance
in the range of punishments is a function of mental state.  Moreover, the
definition of the crimes specifically states the elements to which the
mental state is directed.  That is to say, it is not intentional fire-starting
generally that makes the difference between arson and reckless burning; it
is the intention to do harm to someone else’s property that makes the
difference.  This is in keeping with a criminal law that respects real distinc-
tions in blameworthiness: starting fires per se is innocent—it is the deci-
sion to place another person’s building at risk that is culpable.  Intuitively,
someone who starts a bonfire for a party but was not aware of the risk to
other’s property is not so blameworthy as the person who starts the same
bonfire in conscious disregard of the danger that it will catch his neigh-
bor’s house on fire.
The Code’s pattern of careful attention to the mental states of offend-
ers and its modulation of punishment thereby is in keeping with the
drafter’s goal “to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and
25. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 691 (1983) (calling
it “the most significant and enduring achievement of the Code’s authors”).
26. See Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
594, 601 (1963) (“With analytic precision unrivaled by any other treatment of the
subject of which I am aware, the Code sets forth four modes of culpability . . . .”).
27. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 1.
28. Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal Code, 39
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2013).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 6.06.
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minor offenses.”32  The same spirit animates the rejection of the Pinkerton
doctrine by the Code’s drafters, who feared that the “law would lose all
sense of just proportion” if the rule in Pinkerton were embraced.33  They
were aware that conspiracy law had been applied to large conspiracies,
formed of a leadership group and scattered lieutenants.34  Courts call
these hub-and-spoke conspiracies because the lieutenants, the spokes, may
have no knowledge of the other spokes or their activities.35  The Code’s
drafters did not want each “spoke” subject to criminal liability for
“thousands of additional offenses of which he was completely unaware and
which he did not influence at all.”36
In lieu of establishing a rule of vicarious liability for coconspirators,
the Code drafters suggested that the law of complicity was sufficient to
catch those coconspirators who ought to be held responsible for the sub-
stantive crimes of their fellows.37  A look at the Code’s complicity provi-
sions will show how this is the case.  They stamp as an accomplice to a
crime anyone who “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the com-
mission of the offense . . . aids or agrees to aid such other person in plan-
ning or committing it.”38  In a case brought against a defendant for
substantive crimes committed by his coconspirators, the fact of the con-
spiracy would be evidence, often compelling evidence, that the defendant
aided or agreed to aid his coconspirator in committing the substantive
crimes.39  A jury could rely on this evidence of complicity to find the de-
fendant guilty, but importantly, the jury would not have been instructed
that mere membership in a conspiracy is enough to establish vicarious lia-
bility for the foreseeable crimes of coconspirators.
Notice that by closing Pinkerton Street and forcing prosecutions of co-
conspirators for the substantive crimes of others down Complicity Lane,
the drafters of the Code preserved a culpability requirement.  To be an
accomplice, one must act “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense.”40  As with reckless burning, the necessary
mental state is welded to facts that make the conduct more or less culpa-
ble.  Simply put, accomplice liability is limited to the crimes that the de-
fendant chose to help others carry out.  Again, this tracks an intuitive
distinction in blameworthiness: a person who joins a drug conspiracy with-
32. Id. § 1.02(1).
33. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I § 2.06, at 298 (AM. LAW
INST. 1985); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I, at 298; see also 2.06 cmt.
6(a).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004).
36. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I at 298; see also MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a).
37. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a).
38. Id. § 2.06(3)(a).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I at 298; see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a).
40. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a).
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out knowing that some members want to obtain its retail stock by robbing
a medical marijuana shop is blameworthy, but she is not so blameworthy as
the person who joins the same drug conspiracy and intends to play her
part in the conspiracy by furnishing guns for the robbery.
C. Pinkerton
Pinkerton is a doctrine of vicarious liability that makes a defendant lia-
ble for substantive crimes committed by her coconspirators in furtherance
of the conspiracy so long as those crimes were reasonably foreseeable to
her.41 Pinkerton was a federal case, but the doctrine named for it is good
law in at least a dozen states.42  In some places, the legislature has en-
dorsed it.  The Texas Penal Code, for example, reads:
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,
another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all con-
spirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though hav-
ing no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in
furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should
have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the
conspiracy.43
My concern in this article is with the way the doctrine makes vicarious
liability a matter of what is reasonably foreseeable or what should have
been anticipated.  This is essentially to hold defendants liable for the
crimes of their coconspirators on proof that they were negligent as regards
the possibility that their partners would commit certain crimes as part of
the conspiracy.  Reasonable foreseeability, after all, is just how negligence
is defined in the Model Penal Code:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element
of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct.  The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose
of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable per-
son would observe in the actor’s situation.44
The idea of defining a culpable mental state by what the actor should
have foreseen is not itself objectionable to my mind.  Though some have
41. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 847–48 (11th Cir. 1985).
42. Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 615 n.35 (listing Arkansas, Connecticut, Kan-
sas, Florida, Georgia, Rhode Island, Texas, Nebraska, New Jersey, California, Colo-
rado, Maryland, and Virginia).  States that have rejected Pinkerton include
Washington, Arizona, Nevada, and New York. Id. at 623.
43. TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(b) (West 1994).
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
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said liability for negligence has no place in a criminal code,45 I have writ-
ten elsewhere in defense of criminal negligence, arguing that it is compati-
ble with a robust culpability side-constraint on criminalization.46  What I
find problematic is using a featherweight mens rea like negligence to es-
tablish vicarious liability for even the gravest substantive crimes.
There is reason to believe that the real scope of Pinkerton falls short of
the outer boundaries of the doctrine once courts take the Constitution
into account.  The federal courts of appeals have occasionally indicated
that there are due process limitations on the breadth of Pinkerton liabil-
ity.47  In Alvarez v. United States,48 the Eleventh Circuit heard from three
appellants who had been part of a drug conspiracy.49  The men had acted
as a lookout, go-between, and interpreter respectively during a drug sale
with undercover DEA agents.50  The motel room transaction unexpectedly
turned into a gun battle, and some of the defendants’ confederates shot
and killed one of the disguised federal officers.51
Although it upheld the murder convictions of the coconspirators who
had not participated in the shooting, the circuit court did so only after
convincing itself that the defendants had not been “minor participants” in
the drug transaction.52  The court felt that the Due Process Clause would
bar a Pinkerton conviction in cases involving “attenuated relationships” be-
tween the conspirator and the substantive crime.53  If the conspirator were
indeed only a minor participant or was otherwise ill informed of the cir-
cumstances that precipitated the crime committed by his coconspirators,
due process would forbid holding him vicariously liable for the crime even
if he could have reasonably foreseen its occurrence.54
Importantly however, none of the examples I give in this article of
conspirators being punished more than they deserve for the acts of their
fellows would count as unconstitutional under this embryonic rule.55  As
45. E.g., ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN, supra note 2, at 85.
46. Andrew Ingram, The Good, the Bad, and the Klutzy: Moral Concern and Crimi-
nal Negligence, 34 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 87, 98 (2015).
47. Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of
Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 603–04 (2008) (“By 1991, the Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits had all indicated their support for the proposition that due process
required, at a minimum, the Pinkerton limits on vicarious liability.”).
48. 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985).
49. Id. at 850–51.
50. Id. at 851.
51. Id. at 838–39.
52. Id. at 850–51.
53. Id. at 850 & n.25.
54. Id. at 851 n.27.
55. See United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The
foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern underlying a
possible due process violation.”); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding that convictions were not “so attenuated as to run afoul of
possible due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine”); United States v. John-
son, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We recognize the potential due process
9
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such, while it is important to see that the real reach of Pinkerton, at least in
several of the federal circuits,56 is less than the black letter law implies, it
still reaches far enough to offend the culpability constraint and create the
inconsistencies in state criminal codes that I identify in this piece.
D. Pinkerton’s Critics and Defenders
The Pinkerton doctrine has never been the darling of criminal law
scholars.  As we have seen, the drafters of the Model Penal Code did not
countenance it.  And when Wayne LaFave asked, “Is one who is a member
of a conspiracy of necessity a party to any crime committed in the course
of the conspiracy?”, he answered that “[u]nder the better view,” the ques-
tion had to be “answered in the negative.”57  LaFave’s reasoning, like that
of the Code’s drafters, centered on the draconian potential for charging
minor members of larger conspiracies with the foreseeable crimes of dis-
tant confederates.58
Further doctrinal objections to Pinkerton were well summarized in Jus-
tice Rutledge’s dissent in that case.  He charged the authors of the major-
ity opinion with collapsing the distinction between three separate crimes
defined by Congress: “(1) completed substantive offenses; (2) aiding, abet-
ting or counseling another to commit them; and (3) conspiracy to commit
them.”59  Conspiracy, he emphasized, is a crime in itself with the criminal
act in conspiracy being the agreement itself.60
Rutledge also faulted the majority for mixing civil law principles with
criminal ones.61  For example, the majority opinion is fond of describing
criminal conspirators as “partners,” each of whose acts are considered the
acts of others.62  Rutledge rightly pointed out that what is unremarkable
in civil trials is aberrant in the criminal law: “Guilt there with us remains
personal, not vicarious, for the more serious offenses.”63
limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated relationships
between the conspirator and the substantive crime.”).  I owe this string cite to
Kreit’s article.  Kreit, supra note 47, at 604 n.106.
56. Some state high courts (Connecticut’s for instance) have also stated that
due process limits the application of Pinkerton. See Kreit, supra note 47, at 604
n.106 (citing Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinker-
ton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 134–37 (2006)).
57. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.3(a) (3d ed. 2017).
58. See id.
59. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 649 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing) (footnotes omitted).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 651.
62. Id. at 646–47; see also James M. Shellow, William Theis & Susan Brenner,
Pinkerton v. United States and Vicarious Criminal Liability, 36 MERCER L. REV. 1079,
1080 (1985) (contending that “the Supreme Court imported the civil concept of
vicarious liability into the American law of criminal conspiracy”).
63. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 651 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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In addition to the doctrinal critiques of Pinkerton, the case’s rule has
been attacked on constitutional grounds.  Bruce Antkowiak asserted that
the rule is unconstitutional wherever it is not legislatively created: he al-
leged that it amounts to the creation of a new substantive crime by the
judiciary, thereby infringing due process and the jury right.64  For his part,
Justice Rutledge believed the doctrine permitted two prosecutions for the
same criminal act of conspiring, thereby subjecting the defendant to
double jeopardy.65
The criticism notwithstanding, Pinkerton does have a smaller number
of scholarly defenders: Matthew Pauley, for example, has argued that the
principle is doctrinally sound, as measured against common law tradition,
because it is a “small expansion” of established law on complicity or aiding
and abetting.66  As LaFave notes, the rule can also be defended as a power-
ful tool in the prosecution of modern organized crime.67
Neil Katyal penned the most robust policy apology for Pinkerton and
conspiracy generally in 2003.68  He offers a “functional” defense and does
not respond to retributivist arguments, which he declares are overempha-
sized in criminal law scholarship generally.69  With the support of research
in psychology, economics, and theory of organizations, Katyal shows that
vicarious liability for coconspirators can be a big help to society in combat-
ting crime.
One way Pinkerton helps law enforcement is by increasing the incen-
tives for conspirators to “flip” or turn state’s evidence.70  It is easier to
induce less active or subordinate members of a conspiracy to flip if they
can be threatened with prosecution for the crimes of their more powerful
or active brethren.71  Katyal also points outs that vicarious liability in-
creases the risk of joining a conspiracy and makes those risks more uncer-
64. Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 639.
65. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 652–53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
66. Matthew Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 42
(2005).
67. LAFAVE, supra note 57, § 13.3(a) (citing Developments in the Law—Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 998–99 (1959)).
68. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1307 (2003).
69. Id. at 1311.
70. Id. at 1372.
71. See id. at 1328.  I wrote an article explaining that promising leniency to
criminals in exchange for cooperation in convicting their partners runs the risk of
imposing greater punishments on more honest criminals who refuse to betray
their fellows when tempted to do so.  Andrew Ingram, A (Moral) Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 161, 161–62 (2014).  I
said there that it encourages dishonesty and signals that the government does not
care about the character of its citizens. Id. at 170–71.  I further noted that it per-
versely creates a tortuous dilemma for more virtuous criminals who are loath to
betray their friends or partners. Id. at 171.  I did not call, however, for the aboli-
tion of accomplice plea bargaining but only wished to call attention to these costs
of the practice. Id. at 177.  In this article, I remain willing to grant that the infor-
mation extraction advantages of Pinkerton are indeed net advantages.
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tain.72  “[P]eople are less likely to know the full extent of their liability
under Pinkerton,”73 Katyal writes, which makes sense given that it allows
you to be held liable even for crimes that you did not imagine might be
committed.
The increased uncertainty wrought by Pinkerton also breeds distrust,
and distrust makes it harder for an organization, legitimate or otherwise,
to function well.74  Katyal points to studies in which uncertain dangers
diminish people’s confidence in one another: “[I]n situations where a bad
apple could poison a group, trust is weak.”75  Lastly, Katyal correctly recog-
nizes that insofar as criminals understand how Pinkerton works, they will be
incentivized to monitor and temper the behavior of their partners.76  For
example, if a prudent conspirator is robbing a bank, she has reason to
keep an eye on a coconspirator with a penchant for violence, or better yet,




If you believe that punishment should not exceed culpability, then
you should be concerned that Pinkerton licenses a murder conviction on
the mere proof that the victim’s death was foreseeable to the defendant.
If you care about internal consistency in law, then you should be con-
cerned about using Pinkerton in a Model Penal Code state, where the dif-
ference in mens rea is meant to make a difference in the seriousness of the
crime.
Suppose that Jane, Kelly, Larry, and Mark, all of them brimming with
school spirit, want to have a bonfire if their team wins on Saturday.  Luck-
ily for them, an installation piece by artist Patrick Dougherty has been
standing on the green for eight months.  Made from saplings woven to-
gether to form what look like little hobbit huts, Dougherty’s artwork has
dried out and is now quite flammable.  For that reason, it is due to be torn
down at the end of the month.
After the team wins the big game, Jane, Kelly, Larry, and Mark start to
rally a crowd to go to the green and set the sculpture on fire.  “Huzzah,
let’s do it!” the crowd cheers.  “Hey, bring something to get the fire go-
ing,” the four reply.  They have brought some newspaper and dryer lint to
get the fire started.  Unbeknownst to them, however, one of the students
who has joined their conspiracy on the way to the green is a member of
72. Katyal, supra note 68, at 1372–73.
73. Id. at 1373.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Sharon G. Goto, To Trust or Not To Trust: Situational and Disposi-
tional Elements, 24 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 119, 129 (1996)).
76. Id. at 1374.
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the Student People’s Front.  This student, Nate, decides to fetch some
gasoline.
The four original conspirators start the blaze, and the students are
having a good time.  Even the art lovers are having a good time: the piece
was due to come down anyway, and the flaming sculpture is reminiscent of
a work of art at Burning Man.  Unfortunately, Nate, wishing to start a
larger conflagration that will torch the neighboring economics depart-
ment’s Rand Hall, comes forward with his gasoline and pours it on.  Sure
enough, the fire quickly grows out of control.  Although no one is injured,
a statue of Alan Greenspan is charred.
Dean Wormer is furious about the damage to the Greenspan statute
(a gift from the Heritage Center for Excellence in Freedom Studies) and
relaxes Jane, Kelly, Larry, Mark, and Nate to the secular arm.  The district
attorney shares the dean’s outrage and decides to throw the book at all of
the students.  Lucky for her, she has a video that someone in the crowd
uploaded to Instagram showing Nate, gasoline in hand, shouting his in-
tent to burn Rand Hall.
The New Jersey prosecutor charges Nate with aggravated arson: “A
person is guilty of aggravated arson, a crime of the second degree, if he
starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or an-
other’s . . . With the purpose of destroying a building or structure of an-
other.”77  Turning her attention to the four original conspirators, she
decides to charge them with aggravated arson as well.  Her theory is that
they conspired with Nate and the other crowd members to commit crimi-
nal mischief by burning the stick-pile sculpture: “A person is guilty of crim-
inal mischief if he . . . [p]urposely or knowingly damages tangible property
of another.”78  It was foreseeable, she alleges, that in leading a crowd to
start an illegal bonfire, another member of the raucous crowd, i.e., a
coconspirator, would try to start a larger fire to burn one of the school
buildings: “A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another per-
son when . . . [h]e is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person.”79
Each of the four wants to go to trial at first because each of them
knows that they had no intent to burn down the economics department or
start a larger fire and no knowledge that Nate was going to pour gasoline
on the fire until he was doing it.  Aggravated arson is a crime of the second
degree in New Jersey,80 which may be punished by between five and ten
77. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:17-1(a) (2013).
78. Id. § 2C:17-3(a).
79. Id. § 2C:2-6(b).  Although the statute does not mention foreseeability, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has interpreted it to bring it into line with Pinkerton:
“Accordingly, we conclude, and now holding, that a co-conspirator may be liable
for the commission of substantive criminal acts that are not within the scope of the
conspiracy if they are reasonably foreseeable as the necessary or natural conse-
quences of the conspiracy.”  State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270, 280 (N.J. 1993).
80. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:17-1(a).
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years in prison.81  Each of the four is remorseful, but they do not believe
that they are arsonists or should be treated as such.  Nonetheless, their
attorneys explain to them the risks of going to trial to seek conviction on a
lesser-included offense (like criminal mischief—destroying property worth
less than $2,000, which is a fourth-degree offense82 with a maximum pen-
alty of eighteen months imprisonment)83 or leniency for their sopho-
moric pyrotechnics from the judge at sentencing.  Accordingly, they agree
to make a plea bargain with the prosecution that will give them probation
and an arson conviction but keep them out of prison.
Charging the four students with arson does not respect the culpability
constraint on criminal law.  What the students chose to do was to ignite a
soon-to-be-demolished wooden sculpture, not torch a valuable building
that could have had people inside of it.  There is a great difference in
blameworthiness between them and Nate.  He poured gasoline on the fire
intending to burn down the economics department, and his actions show
far less concern for the rights and well-being of others than do those of
the other four students.  It is this lack of concern that makes him more
culpable than them.84
The four students’ actions were dangerous.  One can understand the
anger of the prosecutor, her sense that crowds starting fires pose a great
threat to the community.  This anger, however, is not a reliable guide to
the culpability of the defendants because it is looking too much at the
results of their actions and not the choices that they made.  It is choice
that “reveals when an actor does not have sufficient concern for others’
interests.”85
Even if you do not care whether criminals are punished more than
they deserve, you ought to be bothered by the inconsistency in the penal
code in this scenario.  Suppose that Jane had acted alone to set fire to the
Dougherty piece on the college green.  After igniting the kindling, she
walks away to avoid detection.  At this point, Nate comes along and sees his
chance to try to burn down the economics building.  He tosses gasoline on
the fire, which grows beyond Jane’s expectations, and scorches Green-
span’s nose.  In this scenario, if the district attorney wished to prosecute
Jane for arson, she would have a much harder row to hoe.  Because Jane
and Nate never formed a conspiracy, she could not use Pinkerton to charge
her.  Rather, she would have to prove that Jane started the fire in the
wooden sculpture with the purpose of burning down the economics build-
ing.  I doubt that a jury would be convinced that was her intent without
some additional evidence that she harbored the sort of hostility to Rand
81. Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(2).
82. Id. § 2C:17-3(b)(2).
83. Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(4).
84. See ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN, supra note 2, at 171 (explaining the
view that culpability consists in knowingly risking harm to others, thereby manifest-
ing lack of respect for them and their interests).
85. Id. at 174.
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Hall that Nate did.  The prosecutor would be much safer charging Jane
with criminal mischief, the code provision that seems tailored by the legis-
lature to fit her conduct.
If the prosecutor has to charge Jane with criminal mischief rather
than arson, then the ladder of incendiary crimes specified by the legisla-
ture in their version of the Model Penal Code is working logically.  Where
Jane wants to destroy a decaying piece of art and not a building, she can
only be charged with a lesser crime.
This logic collapses, however, once Jane is acting in concert with
others.  All of a sudden, it becomes much easier to convict Jane of arson.
The prosecutor need not show that she intended to burn down a building;
all that is necessary is that the destruction of the building have been fore-
seeable.  The district attorney need not carefully take stock of her evi-
dence and decide just how far up the fire-crimes ladder her proof can take
her.  Indeed, she can jump immediately to an arson charge on evidence
that it was foreseeable that someone Jane acted with would try to spread
the fire to a building.  Looking at the code as a whole, this is an arbitrary
shortcut with no rhyme or reason: why should the presence or absence of
a conspiracy affect the proof necessary to obtain a conviction for the same
crime?  Why would a rational drafter establish graded offense with more
or different elements and then place a conspiracy shortcut into the code?
The special dangers that go along with group criminality cannot be cited
as a reason for this shortcut.  The wrong of visiting these dangers on soci-
ety is presumably already accounted for by the crime of conspiracy itself.86
Inconsistent results can flow from inconsistent doctrine.  In the exam-
ples I have given, the prosecutor’s choice to charge a lesser crime directly
or a more serious crime under a Pinkerton theory can make a large differ-
86. The special danger of group criminality is a well-worn justification for
criminalizing conspiracy. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger
and the Corporate Defendant, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 443 (1983).  Apart from the
problem of relying on it twice-over to defend Pinkerton liability, this reason to re-
tain conspiracy as a crime is dubious when it comes to many of the actual conspir-
acy indictments that are handed down today.  As Justice Jackson noted in his
concurring opinion in Kruelwith v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), the term
“conspiracy” smacks of subterranean, arachnid schemes: “It sounds historical un-
dertones of treachery, secret plotting and violence on a scale that menaces social
stability and the security of the state itself.”  336 U.S. at 448 (Jackson, J. concur-
ring).  The reality of many indicted conspiracies today is far more petty and mun-
dane. See id. at 449 (“It also may be trivialized, as here, where the conspiracy
consists of the concert of a loathsome panderer and a prostitute to go from New
York to Florida to ply their trade . . . .”).  The hasty decision of Veronica, Sam, and
Pierce to hunt down Jake over a bad drug deal is a far cry from a Guy Fawkes plot.
In these cases, there is little planning and no enduring criminal organization to
menace society at large or challenge the power of the state.  This argument sup-
ports a conclusion outside the scope of this article—namely that conspiracy law
itself ought to be reined in and restricted to cases in which there is substantial
planning or the formation of a permanent criminal organization.  Any occasion
when two or more people explicitly or implicitly decide together to go commit a
crime and perform an overt act would not then be a “conspiracy.”
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ence in sentencing.  These discrepancies may be aggravated by prosecu-
tors’ abilities to use their charging discretion as leverage in plea
bargaining.87  As in the case of the campus bonfire, a district attorney
need not be able to convince a jury to convict under an attenuated con-
spiracy theory for her to bring a legally sufficient indictment.88  Thus,
sloppy doctrine can be abused by prosecutors before other actors in the
criminal justice system, like judges and juries, are given a chance to reject
the overstretching of a pliant legal theory.89
These faults do not extend to the other criminal law doctrines that
compose the law of parties.  At least as solicitation and complicity are de-
fined in the Model Penal Code, they respect the culpability constraint and
avoid creating a shortcut around the Code’s mens rea requirements.  The
Code states, “A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the
purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, en-
courages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that
would constitute such crime . . . .”90  Solicitation is a crime of the “same
grade and degree as the most serious offense that is . . . solicited.”91  This
is fine: a person who tells someone else to commit a crime is no less culpa-
ble for using another as his instrument.  His culpability is further ensured
by the requirement that he give his directions with the purpose of promot-
ing or facilitating the crime’s commission.92
Complicity, or accomplice liability, is also wrapped in an intent re-
quirement in the Code.93  A person who acts “with the purpose of promot-
ing or facilitating the commission of the offense” is complicit in the crime
of another if he “aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in
87. See Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 703–04 (2014)
(explaining the phenomenon of “vertical overcharging” by prosecutors).
88. See id.
89. Cf. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five
Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000) (“Some
people might cite prosecutorial discretion as a panacea for any legislative over-
reaching.  However, such discretion is as likely to exacerbate as to counteract the
dangers of over-criminalization, and, in any event, blind reliance on discretion at
any level only opens the door to the type of selective, disparate treatment that
adjudication rules should combat.” (footnote omitted)).
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1985).
91. Id. § 5.05(1).
92. Id. § 5.02(1).
93. As Matthew Pauley notes in his defense of the Pinkerton rule, the common
law version of the complicity doctrine was latitudinarian and held someone who
intentionally or knowingly aided or abetted a crime liable for its natural and prob-
able consequence, whether or not he intended or foresaw those additional crimes.
Pauley, supra note 66, at 31.  The natural and probable consequences approach to
complicity liability violates the culpability constraint for the same reasons that Pin-
kerton does. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.05[B][5]
(2d ed. 1995) (“[T]he effect of the rule is to permit conviction and punishment of
an accomplice whose culpability is less than is required to prove the guilt of the
primary party.”). However, this is not the topic of this article.
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss1/3
2019] PINKERTON SHORT-CIRCUITS 87
planning or committing it.”94  This is fine for the same reasons that the
Code’s version of solicitation is sound.  Furthermore, in states like New
Jersey95 and Texas96 that adopted the MPC, these provisions were not tam-
pered with and their mens rea safeguards were left intact.
B. An Extreme Case, Texas Capital Murder
The Texas Penal Code allows indictments that transmute Pinkerton
with the offense of capital murder.  This technique can blaze a shortcut,
not just from negligent homicide to murder, but to a conviction that guar-
antees a life-without-parole sentence, maugre what punishment the judge
or jury might have thought justified for a coconspirator who was not a
killer.  This is an extreme example of (1) the way Pinkerton offends the
culpability constraint and (2) the messy consequences of later legislators
tinkering with the text of a model code years after its enactment by their
predecessors.
A person is guilty of capital murder if he intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of an individual and does so in certain enumerated cir-
cumstances.97  These include taking the life of a police officer or a child,
and killing in the course of committing another crime such as kidnapping,
burglary, or robbery.98  In sum, capital murder is differentiated from mur-
der both by the special circumstances element and by the strict mens rea
element.  Whereas capital murder requires intentionally or knowingly
causing the death of another person, a person can be guilty of murder if
he “intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dan-
gerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.”99  Likewise,
satisfying the elements of felony murder only permits a conviction for
murder and not capital murder.100
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3).
95. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:2-6(c) (2013).
96. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2017).
97. Id. §§ 19.02–.03.
98. Id. § 19.03.
99. Id. § 19.02(b)(2).
100. Id. §§ 19.02(b)(3), 19.03(a).  The felony murder rule also offends the
culpability constraint and has come under attack from commentators for that rea-
son. E.g., Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 452 (1985).  Notably, the drafters
of the Model Penal Code only adopted a modified version of the felony murder
rule. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.02(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1985).  A person is guilty of murder if he causes the death of
another “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life.” Id.  The Code establishes a rebuttable presumption that this
was the case if he caused the death while committing one of a number of enumer-
ated violent felonies. Id.  By contrast, the prevailing felony murder rule in the
states today contains no mens rea requirement beyond that integral to the predi-
cate felony. See Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV.
403, 419 (2011) (“[T]hey defined felony murder as causing death in committing
or attempting particular felonies, rather than requiring a particular culpable
mental state with respect to death.”).
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Capital murder was included in the Texas Penal Code as a strategic
move in the constitutional struggle over the death penalty in the 1970s.101
When the Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia,102 the justices ob-
jected to the unpredictable and arbitrary application of the death penalty
by the states.103  At that time, “death st[ood] condemned as fatally offen-
sive to human dignity.”104  When death later got clemency from the Court,
every state that wanted to invite it back had to outline specific circum-
stances that differentiated murders that were death eligible.105  The capi-
tal murder statute was the vehicle for this in the Lone Star State.106
The public struggle over the morality and prudence of the death pen-
alty continued after the Court’s reversal of course in the 1970s.  In time,
those who wished to see fewer people condemned to die began to advo-
cate for a new punishment option for juries: life without parole.  Prior to
2005, a person convicted of capital murder could either be sentenced to
death or life imprisonment.107  The latter, however, was not a guarantee
of imprisonment unto death.  A prisoner sentenced to life was still eligible
for parole.108  If the law instead promised juries that a capital defendant
sentenced to life in prison would stay there permanently, many opponents
of sanguinary punishment thought that they would be more likely to
choose confinement over death.  As one scholar wrote at the time, “Juries
are likely to consider parole eligibility when making the decision between
life and death and where life without parole is not an option, may feel
compelled to impose the death penalty simply to ensure that an offender
is permanently incapacitated.”109
When the prosecution indicts a defendant for capital murder, it
chooses whether to pursue the death penalty.110  If it obtains a conviction
and is arguing that the defendant should die, then the jury is asked to
answer a series of special questions that determine whether the defendant
101. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268 (1976) (“After this Court held
Texas’ system for imposing capital punishment unconstitutional in Branch v. Texas,
decided with Furman v. Georgia, the Texas Legislature narrowed the scope of its
laws relating to capital punishment.  The new Texas Penal Code limits capital
homicides to intentional and knowing murders committed in five situations . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
102. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
103. See, e.g., id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 305.
105. See Patrick S. Metze, Death and Texas: The Unevolved Model of Decency, 90
NEB. L. REV. 240, 244 (2011).
106. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (sustaining the new Texas death penalty regime
against constitutional challenge).
107. See Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws
2705, 2705 (2005) (amending the text to instead provide for life without parole).
108. Ellason v. Owens, 526 F. App’x 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2013).
109. Danya W. Blair, A Matter of Life and Death: Why Life Without Parole Should
Be A Sentencing Option in Texas, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 204 (1994) (footnote
omitted).
110. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 §§ 1, 2(a)(1) (West 2017).
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will receive a fatal sentence or life without parole.111  If it obtains a convic-
tion without pursuing the death penalty, there is no sentencing phase and
the defendant is automatically sentenced to life without parole.112
Despite its origin as an accommodation to the Supreme Court’s re-
strictions on the use of the death penalty, the capital murder statute is now
mostly used to obtain life without parole sentences.  In 2017, prosecutors
filed 446 capital murder cases and only sought the death penalty in three
instances.113  In that same year, there were 249 capital murder convic-
tions.114  By way of comparison, there were 854 murder indictments filed
and 536 murder convictions obtained in 2017.115  Observers of the Texas
criminal justice system have begun to notice that capital murder charges
are no longer “being reserved for the ‘worst of the worst.’”116
“It is well-settled in Texas that a person can be found guilty of capital
murder as a conspiring party . . . .”117  Although no data is available on
exactly how many people are charged with or convicted of capital murder
on a Pinkerton theory of vicarious liability,118 opinions in appellate cases
111. Id. art. 37.071 § 2.
112. Id. art. 37.071 § 1.  If the defendant is a juvenile, then he or she will
receive a regular life sentence. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(1) (West 2017).
113. Office of Court Administration, Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judi-




116. Scott Henson, One in Three Murder Charges in TX a Capital Case, GRITS FOR
BREAKFAST (May 2, 2018, 8:44 AM), http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2018/
05/one-in-three-murder-charges-in-tx.html [https://perma.cc/MB4K-KJWW].
117. Longoria v. State, 154 S.W.3d 747, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. denied).  This statement holds true for both cases in which the prosecu-
tion pursues the death penalty and those it does not.  During the sentencing
phase, a death qualified jury is given an antiparties instruction: it must answer
“whether the defendant actually caused the death of the deceased or did not actu-
ally cause the death of the deceased but intended to kill the deceased or another
or anticipated that a human life would be taken.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
37.071 § 2(b)(2) (West 2017).  “Awareness” is close to how the Penal Code defines
recklessness: “A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist
or the result will occur.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(c).  This elevates the mens
rea required beyond the mere negligence standard of Pinkerton.  Nonetheless,
awareness is still something less than the knowledge or intent ordinarily required
for capital murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02–.03.  Although the death
penalty is not a focus of this section, I agree with prior scholarship that the use of
Pinkerton in Texas death cases still can offend the culpability constraint despite the
antiparties instruction. See Omar Randi Ebeid, Death By Association: Conspiracy Lia-
bility and Capital Punishment in Texas, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1831, 1852 (2009).
118. See Scott Henson, Unanswered Questions About Law-of-Parties Beyond Death
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reveal numerous instances in which this has occurred.119  For instance,
the court described the facts in Ervin v. State as follows:
Appellant’s guilt is established by her own words documented in
her second and third statements.  No evidence contrary to her
statements was admitted at the trial.  In her statements, appellant
admits that she drove Dexter and Keithron to the carwash where
a man was washing a barbeque pit in a large truck, and she
dropped them off there.  She admits she knew Dexter and
Keithron both had guns.  She saw them put on their bandana
masks and hoodies as they got out of her car.  She states that she
“knew they were going to rob someone in the carwash.”  While
the two men were robbing the man at the carwash with a firearm,
appellant acknowledges that she stayed nearby.  After she heard a
loud gunshot coming from the direction of the carwash, she re-
turned to the location to pick up Dexter and Keithron, who were
standing on the street wearing black hoodies and holding their
black bandana masks.  Appellant stopped her car, they got in the
car, and she drove them from the carwash to Keithron’s house.
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably deter-
mined that appellant entered into an agreement with Dexter and
Keithron to commit the aggravated robbery of the man at the
carwash, Davis, because she drove them to the location, left them
there with their guns and wearing bandana masks and hoodies,
knowing they were going to rob the man.  The jury could also
have reasonably determined that Dexter murdered Davis in fur-
therance of the conspiracy to rob him because he shot him dur-
ing the course of taking Davis’s cell phone that Davis’s wife said
was missing from Davis.  Furthermore, from appellant’s state-
ments, the jury could have reasonably determined that she
should have reasonably anticipated the murder of Davis by Dex-
ter as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy because she
knew he had a loaded firearm when he went wearing a mask and
hoodie to rob Davis.  She also knew that immediately before Da-
vis was killed, Dexter had driven Keithron to an area nearby
where Keithron had robbed a lady at a bus stop with a firearm.120
“The jury found her guilty, and, because the State did not seek the
death penalty, punishment was automatically assessed at life imprisonment
119. E.g., Quigley v. State, No. 02-15-00441-CR, 2017 WL 930066, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Mar. 9, 2017, no pet.); Demus v. State, 05-09-00175-CR, 2010
WL 277092, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2010, pet. ref’d); Bell v. State, 2-07-
166-CR, 2008 WL 4053005, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2008, pet.
ref’d).
120. Ervin v. State, 333 S.W.3d 187, 201–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted).
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without parole.”121  There is nothing to complain of in the court’s analysis
of the sufficiency of the evidence.  What is noteworthy about this case is
that it illustrates that successful prosecutions of defendants like Veronica
(the driver who I imagined at the beginning of this article) for capital
murder are a reality.
The disparity between culpability and prison term when defendants
are convicted in these cases is aggravated by the inability of judge or jury
to modulate the punishment meted out at sentencing.  In ordinary Texas
felony cases, the defendant can elect before trial to be sentenced by either
the judge or the jury.122  Regardless of which path the defendant has cho-
sen, the rules of evidence are greatly relaxed at sentencing, and the defen-
dant and prosecution can offer any relevant evidence, including evidence
bearing on character and the circumstances of the crime.123  Given this
opportunity in a case like Veronica’s, the defense attorney would certainly
remind the jury as often as she could that her client was only the driver
and not the killer.  Furthermore, Veronica herself could take the stand
and testify that she did not want or expect anyone to be killed.  Were a
defendant like Veronica convicted of murder rather than capital murder,
she and her counsel could avail themselves of these opportunities to argue
for a prison term between five years and life.124  It is quite plausible that
judge or jury would see a person who was not carrying a gun or directing
someone else to kill as less culpable than her coconspirators.
The loss of a chance at parole in these cases obviously cuts off another
opportunity for a person with power in the criminal justice system to rec-
ognize that a Pinkerton defendant is not so culpable and not so deserving
of an extreme prison sentence.  Normally, a Texas “inmate is eligible for
release on parole when the inmate’s actual calendar time served plus good
conduct time equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years,
whichever is less.”125
From a doctrinal standpoint, the combination of Pinkerton and capital
murder exhibits the dangers that come from legislative tampering with a
model code, both at the time of adoption, and in the decades that follow.
The Model Penal Code provides neither for Pinkerton liability nor a sepa-
rate offense of capital murder distinct from murder.126  In enacting the
capital murder provision, the legislature sought to limit its application to
intentional or knowing homicides, but because they also adopted Pinker-
ton, this limitation is easily circumvented in homicide prosecutions of co-
conspirators.  Managing the complicated interplay of different statutes is
121. Id. at 195.
122. TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. art. 37.07 § 2(b).
123. Id. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1).
124. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a) (West 2017).
125. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.145(f) (West 2017).
126. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Re-
vised Comments 1985) (“Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or negligent
homicide.”).
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one of the virtues of adopting an architectonic code, but these advantages
are lost or diluted when changes are made for political or policy reasons
divorced from considerations of harmonious drafting.  For example, capi-
tal murder was invented in response to the Court’s decision in Furman.  It
is also probable that concerns about effective law enforcement raised by
prosecutors motivated the legislature’s adoption of Pinkerton.  As evidence,
consider that in New Jersey, the legislature adopted a similar amendment
to the MPC on the recommendation of the attorney general’s office, after
that body asserted the rule’s importance to organized crime
prosecutions.127
Continuing this theme, there is a sad irony in the fact that the hu-
mane amendment that made life without parole a choice for death quali-
fied juries also mandates that coconspirators like the driver in Erwin are
permanently locked up upon conviction.  Here again, piecemeal tinkering




Nothing in the foregoing should be taken for a categorical denial that
people who could have foreseen the crimes that would be committed by
their coconspirators are blameworthy for those crimes.  Beyond the culpa-
bility they may bear for conspiring or committing the crime that is the
object of the conspiracy, they may be truly blameworthy for negligently
contributing to the foreseeable crimes Pinkerton counts against them.  This
does not mean, however, that they are as blameworthy as one who reck-
lessly, knowingly, or intentionally commits those crimes.
Pinkerton amounts to a negligence standard for coconspirators,128 and
I argued in a past article that a conviction based on criminal negligence
can satisfy the culpability constraint.129  My position, built off of the philo-
sophical work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly on the subject of praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness, is that failure to avert to foreseeable risks is blame-
worthy when that neglect reflects a failure of moral concern.  Moral con-
cern is a matter of responsiveness to moral reasons.130
Moral reasons are just the facts that make an action right or wrong.131
For example, the fact that you promised to help your friend move over the
weekend is the reason that you ought to take your truck to his apartment.
By the same token, that someone could be hurt is a moral reason not to
burn down a building.  When an arsonist strikes in order to obtain insur-
127. State v. Bridges, 628 A.2d 270, 276 (N.J. 1993).
128. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
129. Ingram, supra note 46, at 98.
130. NOMY ARPALY, UNPRINCIPLED VIRTUE: AN INQUIRY INTO MORAL AGENCY 79
(2003).
131. NOMY ARPALY, MERIT, MEANING, AND HUMAN BONDAGE 14 (2006).
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ance money, he shows a blameworthy lack of responsiveness to that moral
reason.
It is also possible to act for antimoral reasons, such as when an abuser
hits his girlfriend because it will hurt her or because it will cow her.  As
Arpaly writes, “[I]f what makes it wrong to strike someone is the fact that
doing so would cause suffering to a fellow human being and Iago strikes
someone in order to make a human being suffer, then he does not simply
fail to respond to moral reasons but ‘antiresponds’ to them.”132
The negligent person differs from the reckless person in that the lat-
ter is aware that his conduct creates an unjustified and substantial risk to
others, whereas the former is not aware but should have been.133  Negli-
gence can nonetheless be blameworthy when the failure to avert to the
risks of one’s conduct is due to lack of concern for the well-being of others
rather than a morally neutral disability like fatigue or senility.  Philosopher
of law Anthony Duff offers the example of a man accused of rape who
claims that he thought his victim was consenting.134  Even if we credit the
defendant’s story, Duff says that we may still think him blameworthy if his
attitude towards his victim did not manifest “a proper respect for the wo-
man’s rights.”135  We can imagine a misogynist who “never considered
whether his victim might not be consenting, because his disdain for wo-
men blinded him to her humanity, rights, and agency.”136  Arpaly makes
the point well:
If one cares about morality, moral facts matter to one emotion-
ally, and they are salient to one.  As a result, other things being
equal, a person of more moral concern will be more sensitive to
moral features of situations—more apt to notice, for example,
that a fellow human being is showing signs of distress.137
The negligent person is less culpable than the person who performs
the same acts conscious of the harms she is risking and much less culpable
than the person who performs the same acts intending to cause those
harms.  Consider Veronica who drove her boyfriend Sam around town
when he was looking for Jake, the man who had ripped him off.  Suppose
that Veronica had seen Sam with his gun and heard him say that he is
going to find Jake to “get what’s mine.”  Veronica may not be aware of the
“substantial and unjustified risk” that Sam will kill Jake or kill someone
else.  Though she is angry at Jake and wants Sam to get his money back,
she may be telling herself that Sam is carrying a gun “just in case” and
probably will not use it.  Veronica here is failing to see the risk posed to
132. Id.
133. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)-(d) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985) (defining recklessness and negligence).
134. R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 171 (1990).
135. Id.
136. Ingram, supra note 46, at 117.
137. ARPALY, supra note 130, at 87.
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life by what she and Sam are doing.  Even so, if her oversight stems from a
deficit of concern for the lives of Jake and her neighbors, then she is
blameworthy.
Veronica, a negligent coconspirator, is blameworthy but not so blame-
worthy as an intentional killer.  In an extreme case, someone who inten-
tionally takes someone’s life out of hatred or spite is not just failing to
respond to moral reasons, she is antiresponding to them.  This person is
plainly more blameworthy than the negligent actor, who by definition can-
not commit a crime for the reasons that make it wrong because she is not
averting to the facts that constitute those reasons.
In other instances of intentional killing, the criminal is not an-
tiresponding to moral reasons but simply not responding to them.  His
motive, for instance, is to escape the store with the money from the cash-
ier’s drawer without being caught.  If he shoots to kill the clerk to keep
from being identified later, he ignores a host of moral reasons against
what he is doing.  True, he is not spiteful or sadistic—he is not killing the
clerk for the reasons that make it wrong—and yet, because he knows what
he is doing and is doing it on purpose, he still seems much more blame-
worthy than negligent Veronica.  Failing to respond to moral reasons
when they are staring you in the face shows a much graver deficit of moral
concern than does failing to see them through a fog of contingencies.
Stripped of philosophical jargon, it is plain that someone who can look at
an innocent clerk and pull the trigger has made a far more wicked choice
than has someone who chauffeurs an armed and angry man who is look-
ing for a confrontation.
B. Legislative Reform
In order to make Pinkerton compatible with the culpability constraint
on the criminal law and eliminate it as a shortcut sliced through the penal
code, I propose modifying it to allow liability only for those offenses for
which the actor held the kind of culpable mens rea sufficient to commit
the substantive offense.  For example, I would modify the Texas statute to
read as follows:
If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony,
another felony is committed by one of the conspirators in fur-
therance of the unlawful purpose, each of the other conspirators
is guilty of the felony actually committed or a lesser included of-
fense thereof, provided that the other conspirator acted with the
kind of culpability that suffices to commit the felony or lesser
included offense with which he or she is charged and the offense
was a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.
When acting intentionally suffices to commit the felony or
lesser included offense, a conspirator acts intentionally if it is the
conspirator’s conscious objective or desire that a coconspirator
24
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will engage in conduct that constitutes the felony or lesser in-
cluded offense or when he or she is reasonably certain that a
coconspirator will engage in conduct that constitutes the felony
or lesser included offense.138
When acting knowingly suffices to commit the felony or
lesser included offense, a conspirator acts knowingly when he or
she is reasonably certain that a coconspirator will engage in con-
duct that constitutes the felony or lesser included offense.
When acting recklessly suffices to commit the felony or
lesser included offense, a conspirator acts recklessly if the con-
spirator consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable139
risk that a coconspirator will engage in conduct that constitutes
the felony or lesser included offense.
When acting with criminal negligence suffices to commit the
felony or lesser included offense, a conspirator acts with criminal
negligence if the conspirator ought to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that a coconspirator will engage in conduct
that constitutes the felony or lesser included offense.140
This reform has the advantage of enabling convictions of negligent or
reckless conspirators while ensuring that they are no easier to convict and
that they receive no more punishment than negligent or reckless defend-
ants who are not part of a conspiracy.  It does so by taking advantage of the
familiar concept of a lesser included offense.  This prevents culpable con-
spirators from slipping through the cracks where there is a mens rea mis-
match.  For example, one conspirator commits a crime in furtherance of
138. The disjunctive definition is necessary because some crimes, notably
theft, require intentional rather than simply knowing action. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 31.03(a) (West 2017) (“A person commits an offense if he unlawfully
appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.”).  The culpa-
bility difference between someone who knows that his coconspirator will commit a
crime in furtherance of the conspiracy and one who intends that his coconspirator
will commit that crime is vanishing, however.  This is reflected by the fact that the
code typically allows the same offense to be committed intentionally or knowingly
and for equivalent punishments in either case. See, e.g., id. § 22.01(a)(2) (defining
assault as “intentionally or knowingly threaten[ing] another with imminent bodily
injury”).
139. I think it is hard to imagine that the risk will ever be justifiable given the
criminal ends the conspirators are pursuing.
140. The latter paragraphs specify how to treat collateral crimes, making
them a “result” or part of the “circumstances surrounding” the vicariously liable
conspirators’ conduct. Cf. id. § 6.03.  Further guidance as to the meaning of mens
rea terms should of course come from their primary definitions in the code. Id.
For example, “substantial and unjustifiable risk” should have the same meaning
here that it does generally: “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s
standpoint.” Id.
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the conspiracy knowingly or intentionally; his culpable coconspirator was
conscious of or should have been conscious of the risk this would happen.
Given the proposed rule, the culpable coconspirator cannot escape vicari-
ous liability simply because she acted recklessly or negligently while her
partner in crime acted intentionally or knowingly.  On the contrary, she
can still be held vicariously liable for a lesser included offense of the crime
committed by her partner.141
Invoking lesser included offenses also accounts for other mismatches,
such as when a conspirator believed that his fellow was going to steal prop-
erty of a certain value in furtherance of the conspiracy but the value of the
property he stole was ultimately higher.  In Texas, an offense “is a lesser
included offense if . . . it differs from the offense charged only in the
respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, prop-
erty, or public interest suffices to establish its commission.”142  A bank rob-
ber who believed his coconspirator was going to steal a cheap, late model
car to be the getaway vehicle is vicariously liable for theft of property with
that value; he neither escapes all liability when the coconspirator steals a
new Cadillac, nor is he punished for the more serious offense of stealing
the expensive car (that he did not know his partner would take).
The proposed amendment would enable the prosecution of Veronica
for negligent homicide.143  This is a lesser included offense of murder,144
the crime committed by Sam.  If the prosecution could show that Veronica
was not just negligent but reckless about the possibility that Sam would kill
someone (suppose Sam told her that he would “shoot anyone who got in
his way”), they could charge her with manslaughter.  This is also a lesser
included offense of murder145 because like negligent homicide, it differs
from murder “only in the respect that a less culpable mental state suffices
to establish its commission.”146
If adopted in Texas, my proposal would prevent the capital murder
convictions of conspirators I describe in this article.  This is because none
of these conspirators plausibly knew about or intended the homicides in
question, and capital murder can only be committed intentionally or
knowingly.147  These cases represent extreme violations of the culpability
constraint and are instances in which a conviction for manslaughter or
negligent homicide intuitively fits the crime much better.
141. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.09 (West 2017) (“An offense is a lesser
included offense if . . . it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a
less culpable mental state suffices to establish its commission . . . .”).
142. Id. art. 37.09.
143. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (“A person commits an offense if he
causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence.”).
144. Saunders v. State, 913 S.W.2d 564, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
145. Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
146. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.09 (3).
147. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a).
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My proposal contrasts with that of other Pinkerton critics in that it
leaves the doctrine as a tool, albeit a less handy one, for prosecutors.
Whether you think this is better than abolition may depend upon what
you think of holding people criminally liable for harms that were foresee-
able but which they did not foresee.  Opponents of criminal negligence
like Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan148 would probably still
be unhappy with Pinkerton unless it were further restricted to require that
the defendant acted recklessly—that he or she consciously anticipated that
his or her coconspirator would commit the collateral crime in furtherance
of the conspiracy.
People like Neil Katyal who back Pinkerton on functional, policy
grounds ought to be able to accept the doctrine in this modified form.
While adding the mens rea element may make it harder for prosecutors to
convict or credibly charge defendants with the most serious crimes, the
ability to charge conspirators with lesser included offenses preserves much
of Pinkerton’s power as the plea-extorting, information-extracting crowbar
that Katyal commends.  For one thing, prosecutors could rise to the occa-
sion and confront defendants in some cases with evidence that they knew
certain crimes in service of the conspiracy would be committed.  But even
when they could only prove negligence or recklessness, the threat of vicari-
ous liability would remain.149
Katyal also praises Pinkerton for increasing the uncertainty and risk
involved in joining a conspiracy.  By the same token, he lauds it for en-
couraging coconspirators to keep tabs on one another.  The uncertainty
that comes with joining a conspiracy remains even if Pinkerton has a new
culpability requirement.  The person contemplating joining a conspiracy
still faces known unknowns—confederates’ crimes he has not foreseen but
should have anticipated.  The magnitude of the risk is diminished cer-
tainly—he can only be vicariously liable for a negligence crime in this sce-
nario—but the indefinite scope of his liability still remains.  Katyal sees
doubt about the hazards in play as itself dissuasive and an obstacle to crim-
148. ALEXANDER & KESSLER FERZAN, supra note 2, at 85.
149. This depends upon the presence of a lesser included offense with a neg-
ligence or recklessness mens rea.  In Texas, for example, assault can be committed
recklessly, TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1), but theft can only be committed inten-
tionally or knowingly, see id. § 31.03.  Thus, given my proposed reforms, some con-
spirators could escape vicarious liability even if they were reckless or negligent
about the offenses their coconspirators would go on to commit.  From a retribu-
tivist perspective, this is what consistency requires: if society does not want to
criminalize negligently depriving someone of property then someone who joins a
conspiracy negligent as to the possibility that a partner in crime would commit a
theft in its service should not be subject to additional criminal liability.  Of course,
a retributivist might also hold that legislatures should criminalize more kinds of
negligent or reckless acts.  Regardless, I think that this leaves plenty for prosecu-
tors to work with since the unplanned but foreseeable crimes committed in fur-
therance of a conspiracy that surpass the severity of the object crime itself are
typically homicides or assaults.
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inal cooperation,150 and this doubt would remain even if prosecutors were
forced to charge negligent homicide rather than murder under a version
of Pinkerton that respected retributivism.  The same can be said of encour-
aging conspirators to look over each other’s shoulders.  What you do not
know about what your confederates are doing can still hurt you on sen-
tencing day (albeit not as much), and so the incentive to monitor other
members of the conspiracy remains.
One advantage identified by Katyal is almost untouched by the pro-
posed reform: the incentive to moderate the behavior of your companion
conspirators.  Criminals who know that their partners are going to commit
collateral crimes in support of the conspiracy are still incentivized to pre-
vent those crimes from occurring.  In the case of a homicide, a robbery
conspirator who knows that his partner is going to deviate from their plan
and shoot the security guard will be guilty of murder—not manslaughter
or negligent homicide—regardless of what version of Pinkerton governs.151
The only difference would be in the potential issues that the defendant
could raise at trial, i.e., denying that he knew what his partner would do
during the robbery.
Finally, as I noted above, judges and commentators have raised consti-
tutional objections to Pinkerton.  Bruce Antkowiak, for instance, has argued
that in “every place where Pinkerton lives by the will of the courts alone,
the doctrine should be retired given its impact on the jury right and the
grave due process problems it creates.”152  My proposal, of course, is a
modification to the statutory text that implements Pinkerton in some states.
In jurisdictions that have adopted Pinkerton by judicial decision, altering
the doctrine in the way I suggest would not cure Antkowiak’s concerns
about its constitutionality.  In that case, one who took those concerns to
heart might still prefer excising the doctrine from the law.  On the other
hand, both Antkowiak’s concerns and my own could be satisfied if the
legislatures in those jurisdictions with common law Pinkerton enacted a
statute with the mens rea bumpers I propose.
V. CONCLUSION
Criminal law doctrine ought to be taken seriously.  Even though it is
statute based and frequently jostled by legislatures, it still deserves the
thoughtful attention of lawyers.  This is true whether or not one believes
that the criminal law should be subject to the culpability constraint.  As in
other subjects like contracts, there is room to identify good and bad law—
150. See Katyal, supra note 68, at 1342–43 (“Legal risks cannot be contracted
away because the parties cannot know the risk with precision; therefore, an agree-
ment may be more difficult to strike.”).
151. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1) (explaining that murder can be
committed intentionally or knowingly).
152. Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 639.
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law that is inconsistent, illogical, or poorly drafted—regardless of differing
views on policy or philosophy.
My proposal aims to normalize outcomes across cases of individual
and group action.  It is a suggestion to treat individuals alike—those who
commit their crimes in groups and those who commit them alone.  If we
think conspiring itself should be a crime, that is fine and a sound basis to
differentiate between solo criminals and social ones, but whatever fault we
judge there to be in the act of conspiring itself, it shouldn’t change the
fact that a reckless homicide is manslaughter and a knowing or intentional
one is murder.  Someone who recklessly causes the death of another by
driving for her angry boyfriend should not be convicted of capital murder
and sentenced to life without parole while her counterpart who recklessly
causes the death of another by driving drunk is convicted of manslaughter
and sentenced to fifteen years.
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